Once again on the Strait of Hormuz crisis

Once again on the Strait of Hormuz crisis

CORPORATE INTERVENTION AND THE CHINA FACTOR

Firstly, it should be noted that the global market entered the crisis with a stock buffer of 8.2 billion barrels, which mitigated the initial effects of the shock. The oil price shock caused by the supply crisis prompted market participants to draw down these stocks at a record pace, resulting in a substantial release from reserves; furthermore, the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) largest-ever emergency stock release to date also provided the market with additional supply. IEA member countries made a significant contribution to easing the overall pressure by carrying out a record emergency stock release of 400 million barrels from the outset of the conflict.

The Beijing administration, in particular, reduced its crude oil imports by 40% (4.6 million barrels per day) by utilising the massive reserves it had accumulated prior to the crisis; this move was one of the most critical factors in preventing the global supply-demand imbalance from deepening.

ROUTES BYPASSING THE STRAIT

Given the scale of the loss in oil supply from the Gulf states via the Strait of Hormuz, it was clear that oil market stocks would serve only as a limited buffer. Some Asian economies—which are the usual destination for the vast majority of oil and gas passing through the Strait—began to feel the effects of the crisis very rapidly.

Consequently, significant responses were also observed on the supply side; these included some Gulf producers utilising alternative routes to bypass the Strait, as well as an increase in crude oil exports from other suppliers, notably the US.

Looking back, we can see that Gulf producers demonstrated a remarkable degree of infrastructure resilience in the face of the Strait of Hormuz being cut off – a fact we must acknowledge. Saudi Arabia rapidly increased the flow of crude oil via the East-West pipeline to export through the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea. Crude oil exports from Yanbu rose from 2 million barrels per day prior to the outbreak of the war to over 5 million barrels per day by the start of June. Saudi Arabia also increased shipments from its overseas stocks. In parallel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) utilised a range of storage facilities, pipelines and other infrastructure elements, as well as alternative transport routes, to maintain a relatively high level of exports despite significant disruptions. The country has a 380-kilometre pipeline stretching from the Habshan production centre, bypassing the Strait of Hormuz, to the port of Fujairah in the Gulf of Oman; this pipeline enables it to export 1.8 million barrels of crude oil per day. Furthermore, the Mandous underground storage complex near Fujairah, with a capacity of 42 million barrels, has provided the country with additional flexibility. Consequently, by utilising all these alternatives over time, the UAE has managed to bring its exports up to 85 per cent of pre-war levels (4.3 million barrels per day). This rapid supply response was not limited to Gulf producers grappling with the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The crisis shifted the route of global oil trade, at least in part, towards the Atlantic Basin. Whilst the US reached a record export level of 13.1 million barrels per day in May, Kazakhstan, Brazil and Venezuela also played a key role in increasing supply to Asian markets.

THE RESPONSE OF THE GLOBAL REFINING SYSTEM

Finally, the global refining system made rapid adjustments to compensate for the collapse in refined product exports from the region. The Middle East was the world’s largest source of aviation fuel for international markets in 2025; consequently, the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz at the end of February withdrew a significant portion of the global jet fuel supply from the market. The impact of this situation was felt most acutely in Europe, where the vast majority of jet fuel imports are sourced from the Middle East.

Alternative suppliers moved swiftly to fill this gap. Whilst refineries in the US produced record volumes of aviation fuel in response to the crisis, jet fuel output in Europe also rose to record levels. As a result of all these activities, the US shifted from being a net importer of jet fuel in April 2025 to becoming a net exporter by early 2026. West Africa’s jet fuel exports nearly doubled compared to the previous three-month average, largely driven by increased production at the Dangote refinery in Nigeria.

LASTING EFFECTS

Meanwhile, as we enter the period when demand is set to peak during the summer months, global oil stocks are being depleted at a record pace. The tools available to boost supply are partly of a temporary character, and their effectiveness has diminished. It is precisely at this juncture that the potential US–Iran agreement announced in recent days has raised the prospect of the Strait of Hormuz reopening, with the first signs that exports have commenced. However, legitimate concerns about the agreement’s future and viability mean that the risk of a new crisis in July and August remains on the agenda. This crisis will leave lasting scars on the global energy sector. Governments and energy monopolies are redesigning their supply routes, trade partnerships and investments in alternative fuels and technologies in line with this new geopolitical reality. The Strait of Hormuz shock has gone down in history not merely as a temporary supply disruption, but as a structural turning point testing the resilience and flexibility of the global oil industry. Unfortunately, there is as yet no serious indication that our country has recognised this turning point and will take the necessary structural measures.

Note: This article is translated from the original article titled Kırılgan anlaşmanın gölgesinde: Yeniden Hürmüz Boğazı krizi üzerine, published in BirGün newspaper on June 26, 2026.