What would the vote share be if a new party is formed by breaking away from the CHP?
What would the vote share be if a new party is formed by breaking away from the CHP?
While the AKP ranked second with 24.00 per cent, protest votes were measured at 9.29 per cent, and the proportion of undecided voters or those with no opinion stood at 7.36 per cent.
The DEM Party received 6.10 per cent, the CHP 4.68 per cent, the MHP 4.29 per cent, the Zafer Party 3.88 per cent, the İYİ Party 3.68 per cent, the Anahtar Party 2.59 per cent, the Yeniden Refah Party 2.03 per cent, Other Parties 1.83 per cent and the TİP 0.54 per cent.
With the distribution of undecided, no-opinion and protest votes, the new party rose to 35.65 per cent, becoming the leading party by a clear margin.
While the AKP remained in second place with 28.79 per cent; the DEM Party was measured at 7.32 per cent, the CHP at 5.61 per cent, the MHP at 5.15 per cent, the Zafer Party at 4.66 per cent, the İYİ Party at 4.42 per cent, the Anahtar Party at 3.11 per cent, the Yeniden Refah Party at 2.44 per cent, Other Parties at 2.20 per cent and the TİP at 0.65 per cent.
METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
The study by GÜNDEMAR Research, titled “Turkey Agenda Research May 2026”, was conducted between 24 and 27 May 2026 across 60 provinces throughout Turkey. In the survey, 2,275 individuals aged 18 and over were interviewed using CATI (Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing) and CAWI (Computer-Assisted Web Interviewing) methods.
The study, conducted using a stratified sampling method based on neighborhood/village size, education level and past election results, was announced to have a confidence interval of 95 per cent and a margin of error of ± 2.05 per cent.
“A POLITICAL FRACTURE”
Evaluating the survey results, Prof. Dr Tamer Bolat stated that the absolute nullity decision should be read not merely as a legal and institutional debate, but as a political fracture that could directly influence voter behaviour:
“In the current parliamentary election landscape, the CHP still maintains its appearance as the leading party. However, this landscape does not indicate that the CHP electorate is entirely bound to the party’s institutionalism in unalterable loyalty. On the contrary, the political uncertainty arising after the absolute nullity decision reveals that a significant portion of the CHP electorate is turning towards the political cadre and the will for change by whom they feel represented rather than the party signboard itself.”
Bolat emphasized that the second scenario carries the quality of a critical warning for the CHP:
“The scenario where Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu remains at the helm of the CHP, whilst Özgür Özel, Ekrem İmamoğlu and Mansur Yavaş form a new party, demonstrates a powerful shift in representation for the CHP electorate. In this chart, the new party reaching 35.65 per cent in the distributed vote share does not merely point to a high voting potential for a new party. It simultaneously demonstrates that the main body of the CHP electorate could diverge from the current institutional structure and position themselves alongside the reformist actors.”
“CHP’S CAPACITY COULD BECOME DEBATABLE”
Bolat stated that the chart of voter transitions clarifies this finding even further:
“The most striking data is that 72.72 per cent of the CHP electorate turns towards the new party in this scenario. In contrast, the proportion of voters remaining with the CHP is at the level of 12.05 per cent. This result demonstrates that a crisis of leadership and representation that may be experienced within the CHP after the absolute nullity decision could produce far deeper consequences than a limited loss of votes. In such a scenario, not only the CHP’s vote share but also its capacity to be the main opposition could become debatable.”
According to Bolat, the new party scenario points not only to an intra-party divergence for the CHP, but also to a broader political realignment:
“The inclination towards the new party is not limited solely to the CHP electorate. In this scenario, 37.21 per cent of the İYİ Party electorate, 23.07 per cent of the MHP electorate, 8.46 per cent of the AK Party electorate and 6.02 per cent of the DEM Party/HDP electorate state that they could vote for the new party. This situation demonstrates that the new party could be perceived not just as a structure breaking away from the CHP, but as a wider political centre of gravity capable of bringing together different segments of the opposition and the centrist electorate.”
NOT MERELY AN INTRA-PARTY MANAGEMENT DEBATE
Bolat concluded his evaluation with the following words:
“The most critical result of the May survey is this: although the CHP appears as the leading party in the current landscape today, the political equation formed after the absolute nullity decision reveals that there is a serious potential for mobility within the CHP’s voter base. While the electorate cares about the name of the CHP and its historical identity, they take a stance in times of crisis according to the questions of who represents the party, who carries the change and who could be the alternative for government. For this reason, the process following the absolute nullity decision is not merely an intra-party management debate within the CHP; it is a grander political test regarding who will be the main vehicle of the opposition in Turkey.”
Note: This article is translated from the original article titled Mutlak butlan anketi: CHP’den ayrılıp yeni parti kurulursa oy oranı ne olur?, published in BirGün newspaper on June 1, 2026.
