The regime’s foundation: the rule of discontent

Sometimes a comedian, sometimes a mayor of a municipality, sometimes an ordinary citizen on the street… Whoever manages to make their presence felt directly on the political stage, the Palace administration is sure to respond.

In this sense, the aim is to prevent the public from placing their hopes in alternatives that lie outside the regime’s established sphere of influence and to prevent the emergence of an insurmountable social barrier against the regime. This climate of repression also deepens the perception within society that ‘nothing we do will make a difference’.

At this point, the voter bloc that has long been referred to as the ‘undecided’ is particularly noteworthy. Citizens who are dissatisfied with the regime’s policies, who take issue with the very existence of the regime, but who cannot find a belief in change within the opposition either, are at the forefront of those marginalised on the political stage.

However, the opposition bloc remains far from possessing the inclusiveness needed to meet the expectations of undecided voters. Just as the desire to rid the country of the regime is strong on the streets, so too are the claims that ‘all parties are the same’ gaining ground.

THE END OF ELECTION POLITICS

A political style that is fixated solely on an election date and resorts to the simplistic notion that ‘the ballot box will come and everything will be sorted out’ has now completely lost its credibility. Transforming Turkey’s problems from abstract rhetoric into a concrete struggle has emerged as the most urgent task facing the social opposition.

Researcher Semih Turan also states that there is a significant accumulation of critical perspectives and social backlash regarding the current political landscape in Turkey, and that these reactions are manifesting in various forms. Noting that in the past, the politics of polarisation directly benefited the AKP, Turan emphasises that today’s social conditions have also changed. Drawing attention to the erosion of the AKP’s core electorate, Turan said: “When undecided and non-responding voters are excluded, the proportion of voters stating they would vote for the AKP is estimated to be around 20–21 per cent.”

MANAGING THE STATE OF APATHY

Consequently, at this juncture, the regime seeks to manage not only voting preferences but also the state of apathy that society has developed towards politics. Apathy refers to a state of disengagement from politics, keeping one’s distance, failing to follow developments, and becoming indifferent to political processes. This situation emerges as a factor that could directly influence future election results, not only for the regime but also for the opposition.

Turan, noting that a significant section of society does not categorically oppose initiatives such as the ‘Peace Process’ or ‘A Turkey Free of Terrorism’, believes that the real issue lies in the political framework within which these processes will take place.

UNDECIDED VOTERS

Turan states that undecided voters will be one of the most important groups determining election results in the coming period, highlighting that the proportion of voters declaring themselves ‘undecided’ can range from 18 per cent to 25 per cent. According to Turan, the fundamental challenge facing the opposition is not merely to form an electoral alliance. What is needed is a broader concept of a political alliance capable of encompassing different opposition components, from the far right to the far left. Turan says, “The key determining factor will be the direction in which the desire for change in society, the behaviour of voters who have become disengaged from politics and are wavering, and the accumulated social energy will be channelled.”

TAKE NOTE OF THE ÜSKÜDAR EXAMPLE

Political communications expert Suat Özçelebi, citing the Üsküdar Municipal Council elections as an example, said that the regime’s manner of exercising political power is increasingly turning into a ‘crisis of credibility’. Özçelebi noted that the interventions targeting Sinem Dedetaş—the Mayor of Üsküdar, who came to office with strong voter support and whose services have been well-received—are perceived by a broad section of society as “pretexts fabricated to wrest the municipality from the opposition’s hands”. He added that these attacks could damage the perception of change and also serve the purpose of alienating society from politics.

Özçelebi nevertheless pointed out that, whatever the outcome in Üsküdar, the regime faces a cost, remarking: “If it loses, the limits of its power will become apparent; if it wins, the excesses of the power it wields will be revealed.” Özçelebi stated that should credibility be lost, what would remain would be the use of “bare force”. He noted that this situation could lead to a process in which the regime would be forced to demand greater obedience even from its own base, adding, “This is precisely where the intoxication of power turns into a loss of power.”

Stating that Turkey’s fundamental issue lies in “restoring all the rules of the political game to a democratic basis and re-establishing constitutional citizenship”, Özçelebi argued that this transformation would only be possible through a “front of resistance” formed not just by the main opposition but by various opposition elements acting in unison: “No one can single-handedly seize the power to change the current regime, whatever its share of the vote; it is only possible through collective action.”

Note: This article is translated from the original article titled Rejimin dayanağı mutsuzluk iktidarı, published in BirGün newspaper on September 8, 2026.